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Quantitative analysis has influenced and sometimes transformed
many disciplines, including economics, finance, and public policy—
1
even wine production, movie production, and athletic recruiting. Its
popularity varies, however, depending on whether its methods appear
to produce results. For example, the “quants” who made portfolio
management a science began to receive blame in 2008 for deflating
the economy. Warren Buffett was particularly biting: “[B]eware of
2
geeks bearing formulas.” In sports, some teams have considered
firing scouts who judge prospective players by watching them play
and instead evaluating talent based on empirical evidence of
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1. IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: HOW ANYTHING CAN BE PREDICTED 1–9, 64–80,
144–49 (2007); Dennis Overbye, They Tried to Outsmart Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009,
at D1 (quoting Warren Buffet).
2. Overbye, supra note 1.
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performance. Empirical enthusiasts claim that statistics reveal
valuable information that the plain eye and intuition overlook. But
critics argue that the empirical movement shortchanges the value of
traditional analytical methods.
Empirical scholars have begun to train these same tools on the
judiciary. They have studied topics ranging from the economic effects
of judicial systems to the influence of ideology on judicial
decisionmaking. Unfortunately, empiricists have often failed to
consult their studies’ subjects—participants in the judicial system—
about their research premises. At the same time, many in the legal
system know little about this literature. Those few lawyers, legal
scholars, and judges who are aware of empirical findings have often
openly resisted them, particularly those studies that emphasize the
attitudinal model, which, in its strongest form, claims that judges
decide cases based on their policy preferences rather than legal
doctrine. The attitudinal model, they say, betrays a cramped view of
the law and represents a fundamental misunderstanding of what
judges do.
Despite these criticisms, the still-nascent field of empirical legal
studies is growing. As databases become more comprehensive and the
technology necessary to process data improves, empirical scholars are
likely to produce more and more sophisticated analyses of legal
4
decisionmaking. But what has the discipline offered the law so far?
Many courts already use data-driven analyses to improve
administrative functions, such as assigning cases, monitoring potential
biases, and creating issue-specific courts. If quantitative approaches
are valuable in these areas, could they also offer useful lessons for
traditional legal analysis? In light of the legal community’s objections
that empiricists fail to understand how lawyers and judges really
argue and decide cases, we thought it would be useful to bring
empirical scholars and the people they study together for a day of
discussion.
The conference focused on several questions:
1. How, if at all, can quantitative measurements explain judicial
behavior?

3. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR
GAME (2003) (describing the rise of quantitative scouting in baseball); Michael Lewis, The NoStats All-Star, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at MM26 (describing the same in basketball).
4. See AYRES, supra note 1, at 130–44 (detailing advances in empirical tools and studies).
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2. What objective criteria for evaluating judicial decisonmaking
would help judges improve?
3. Why do judges resist the attitudinal model and other models of
judicial behavior?
4. How could researchers adjust their models or methods to
better reflect how the legal system operates?
This Symposium emerged from Dean David Levi and Professor
Mitu Gulati’s course at Duke Law School on the study of judicial
behavior. Dean Levi, a former federal district judge, and Professor
Gulati, whose work includes empirical studies of the judiciary, helped
us assemble a group of empirical scholars to present papers and
professors and judges to respond. Trial and appellate judges came
from federal and state courts from across the country. Many of them
have held administrative roles within the judiciary in addition to their
day-to-day courtroom duties. Some judges were familiar with the
empirical literature; others were not. The same was true of the
doctrinal scholars we invited. This mix, we hoped, would provide a
range of perspectives to improve future empirical research and the
legal community’s familiarity with the empirical literature.
The day-long conference, held on February 6, 2009, did not
disappoint. Sometimes disagreeing and often agreeing, our
participants covered a variety of the literature’s strengths and
weaknesses. In the pages that follow, several issues recur.
First, what data are relevant? Dean Levi, in his review of Judge
5
Posner’s book, How Judges Think, faults Posner for ignoring
6
unpublished dispositions. If one wants to know how judges think day
to day, Levi argues, ignoring cases that do not make it into the
reporters—the vast majority—does little to enhance understanding of
7
how judges usually think. In unpublished opinions, judges may
approach cases differently. If one asks a slightly different question—
what is the effect of a particular rule—one would want to see how
8
judges apply the rule in all cases, including unpublished ones. Using
only reported cases provides a narrow, possibly misleading sample,
whereas incorporating unpublished opinions would enable a lawyer to

5. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008).
6. David F. Levi, Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791, 1801–04 (2009) (reviewing
POSNER, supra note 5).
7. Id. at 1803.
8. Id.

CHEMERINSKY WILLIAMS IN FINAL.DOC

5/5/2009 3:35:27 PM

1176

[Vol. 58:1173

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

9

make an empirical argument about how the rule actually works.
10
Consider United States v. Leon, in which the Supreme Court refused
to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence officers obtained
unconstitutionally when the officers reasonably relied on an invalid
11
warrant. According to the Court, the exclusionary rule, which
prevents future misconduct by threatening that courts will exclude
illegally obtained evidence, was inappropriate because the officers did
not know they were violating the Constitution. After all, the Court
implied, officers will not adjust their behavior to conform to
constitutional rules when they believe they are already following the
law. In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun observed that the
majority’s decision rested on an empirical judgment about the effects
of the exclusionary rule—a judgment the Court should be prepared to
reconsider based on new empirical evidence. Unpublished
dispositions would provide the data necessary to evaluate Leon’s
12
effects and whether the Court should reconsider that decision.
Second, how should scholars design empirical studies of legal
decisionmaking? For example, once a scholar decides what to test,
how does the scholar weigh the data? Professors Brennan, Epstein,
and Staudt suggest that the Supreme Court may have consciously
aided the Roosevelt administration’s economic program during the
13
Great Depression. Comparing the percentage of pro-government
votes in tax cases during a routine downturn and during the Great
Depression, the professors determine that the Court voted more
often in favor of the government during the Great Depression than in
other periods, whereas the Court tended to vote against the
government during routine downturns and for the government during
14
normal periods of economic growth. Professor Young and Ms.
Blondel respond that Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt’s approach is
misleading because looking only to the number of pro-government

9. Id.
10. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
11. Id. at 900.
12. To a large extent, this disagreement over how to handle unpublished opinions in the
datasets likely reflects the legal community’s disagreement regarding which opinions courts
should publish and what weight courts and lawyers should give unpublished opinions.
13. Thomas Brennan, Lee Epstein & Nancy Staudt, Economic Trends and Judicial
Outcomes: A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1196 (2009).
14. Id. at 1221.
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case outcomes ignores the relative significance of cases. For
16
example, in United States v. Butler, the Supreme Court struck down
17
a key piece of New Deal tax legislation, which “in its practical
significance . . . may outweigh five or ten ordinary victories in
18
ordinary tax cases.” Young and Blondel’s criticism implies that when
assessing how the Court decides cases in an area of law, the most
important variable is the net effect of the Court’s decisions, not the
number of the Justices’ votes. This discussion about how to measure
particular variables that may determine studies’ outcomes will
continue to receive serious scrutiny.
A third and related issue is distinguishing empiricists’ descriptive
and normative claims. For example, Professors Choi, Gulati, and
Posner rank state supreme courts based on three measures:
19
productivity, opinion quality, and independence. To measure these
subjective characteristics, they use the number of published
20
21
opinions, out-of-state citation numbers, and how often a judge
22
votes with opposite-party judges, respectively. The authors concede
23
that these proxies are imperfect. Determining the right proxies
involves, as Dean Chemerinsky points out, difficult normative
24
choices. Choosing one definition of quality judging necessarily
excludes other important measures, and because empirical studies
need quantifiable data, they may rely too heavily on measurable
criteria and neglect important but hard-to-measure criteria. Chief

15. Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Response, Does the Supreme Court Follow the
Economic Returns? A Response to A Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1759, 1771–33
(2009).
16. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
17. Id. at 74.
18. Young & Blondel, supra note 15, at 1770.
19. Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information
Forcing: Ranking State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1313, 1320 (2009).
20. Id. at 1320.
21. Id. at 1321.
22. Id. at 1323.
23. Id. at 1314; see also Scott Baker, Adam Feibelman & William P. Marshall, Response,
The Continuing Search for a Meaningful Model of Judicial Rankings and Why It (Unfortunately)
Matters, 58 DUKE L.J. 1645, 1647 (2009) (“[W]e strongly suspect that the attributes that the
authors select . . . constitute relatively minor aspects of judicial quality.”); Laura Denvir Stith,
Response, Just Because You Can Measure Something, Does It Really Count?, 58 DUKE L.J.
1743, 1748 (2009) (criticizing the authors’ judicial-quality metric as encouraging a “numbers
game” that emphasizes “quantity over quality”).
24. Erwin Chemerinsky, Response, No Warrant for Radical Change: A Response to
Professors George and Guthrie, 58 DUKE L.J. 1691, 1700–01 (2009).
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Justice Stith of Missouri observes that preferring measurable criteria
can create bad incentives to improve in the rankings instead of
25
improving real quality. These difficulties, which the authors
26
acknowledge, will generate controversies over any decisions to use
proxies, especially in sensitive areas such as judicial rankings.
Fourth, what role should empirical conclusions have in crafting
policy? Professors George and Guthrie determine that the Supreme
Court would reach the same decision in vast majority of cases if it sat
27
in panels. From this foundation, they argue that the Court should sit
in panels so that it could correct lower courts’ errors more often,
28
leaving the en banc procedure available for contentious cases. Judge
29
30
Boudin and Dean Chemerinsky accept their premise, but they
reject George and Guthrie’s proposal. Boudin argues that the Court’s
31
primary function is not, and should not be, error correction. Circuit
splits are not a significant problem; far more important is that the
Justices have time to decide cases of national importance and serve as
ambassadors for the judiciary. Chemerinsky argues that the Court’s
en banc hearings are so ingrained that a Court sitting in panels would
32
lack legitimacy. Additionally, he points out that it is difficult to
determine which cases actually present errors the Court needs to
correct, suggesting that the problem George and Guthrie seek to
33
solve may simply be a phantom.
Finally, the legal community has greeted many empirical findings
skeptically. Professor Richman suggests that legal professionals may
simply feel uncomfortable embracing unfamiliar empirical analyses by
34
nonlawyers who disregard more traditional forms of legal reasoning.
Richman attributes the resistance to empirical evaluations of judicial
behavior in part to the legal community’s strong sense of
25. Stith, supra note 23, at 1748.
26. Choi et al., supra note 19, at 1313 (acknowledging that the measures are “coarse”
(italics omitted)).
27. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the
Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1462–65 (2009).
28. Id. at 1453–68.
29. Michael Boudin, Response, A Response to Professors George and Guthrie, Remaking
the United States Supreme Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1685 (2009).
30. Chemerinsky, supra note 24.
31. Boudin, supra note 29, at 1685–86.
32. Chemerinsky, supra note 24, at 1698–700.
33. See id. at 1694 (“But to speak of ‘errors’ is to beg enormously difficult questions as to
what is ‘correct’ as opposed to ‘erroneous.’”).
34. Barak Richman, Response, On Doctors and Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1731, 1740 (2009).
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professionalism, which may cause lawyers to discount outsiders’
35
evaluations merely because they are not members of the community.
On the other hand, some in the legal community object that
empiricists overlook how conventional legal explanations can inform
36
empiricists’ hypotheses or explain their findings. Many participants
also suggest that how empiricists approach and describe their studies
may contribute to mutual wariness. In particular, empiricists
37
frequently charge that judges make decisions based on “politics,”
which unfortunately resonates with popular debates about judicial
activism and conflates judges’ long-acknowledged discretion when
38
deciding difficult cases with “political” decisionmaking. Judge
Boudin and Dean Levi therefore ask scholars to use the term
39
“politics” more carefully. In addition, any claim that judges operate
beyond the bounds of law is a serious one, and the legal community is
40
likely to react negatively.
We convened the Duke Law Journal Conference on Measuring
Judges and Justice so that empirical scholars and legal professionals
could discuss these issues. All of the articles presented at the
conference follow, and some of the judges and doctrinal legal scholars
also chose to publish their responses. We hope this issue provides an
overview of the contributions that empirical scholars have tried to
make and some criticisms of their efforts. To the extent this
Symposium succeeds, we have our participants to thank.

35. See id. at 1740 (“[J]udges and legal academics often exhibit disregard for, and often
hostility toward, outsiders who employ nonlegal analytical methods to assess judicial quality,
understand judicial reasoning, or predict judicial outcomes.”).
36. See, e.g., Young & Blondel, supra note 15, at 1772 (suggesting that “conventional legal
explanations may well resolve” some of Professors Brennan, Epstein, and Staudt’s findings).
37. See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer, Predicting Judicial Outcomes Through Political
Preferences: The Japanese Supreme Court and the Chaos of 1993, 58 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1558–59
(2009) (arguing that judges “indulge their political biases” from the bench, but that their ability
to do so is an indicator of judicial independence).
38. H. Jefferson Powell, Response, A Response to Professor Knight, Are Empiricists
Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1725, 1725–26
(2009).
39. Boudin, supra note 28, at 1689 (“Figuring out why judges decide cases the way they do
is a worthy enterprise; not so scoring judicial results as ‘political.’”); Levi, supra note 6, at 1795
n.15 (calling Judge Posner’s use of the word “political” “unfortunate”).
40. See, e.g., Baker et al., supra note 23, at 1641 (“[I]t is troublesome to think that [Justices
would] decid[e] cases based on economic conditions unrelated to the merits of the legal issue
before them. They have no constitutional authority to act in this manner.”).

CHEMERINSKY WILLIAMS IN FINAL.DOC

5/5/2009 3:35:27 PM

1180

[Vol. 58:1173

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

We thank the participants in the Duke Law Journal Conference
on Measuring Judges and Justice:
• Scott Baker, University of North Carolina School of Law;
• Larry Baum, The Ohio State University Political Science Department;
• Judge Michael Boudin, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit;
• Thomas Brennan, Northwestern University School of Law;
• James Brudney, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law;
• Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, University of California, Irvine School of Law;
• Stephen Choi, New York University School of Law;
• Judge Allyson Duncan, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit;
• Lee Epstein, Northwestern University School of Law;
• Tracey E. George, Vanderbilt University Law School;
• Mitu Gulati, Duke University School of Law;
• Chris Guthrie, Vanderbilt University Law School;
• Chief Judge Robert Henry, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit;
• Justice Robin E. Hudson, Supreme Court of North Carolina;
• Jack Knight, Duke University School of Law and Political Science Department;
• Dean David F. Levi, Duke University School of Law;
• Judge Gerard E. Lynch, United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York;
• Kevin T. McGuire, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Political Science
Department;
• William P. Marshall, University of North Carolina School of Law;
• Chief Justice Ruth V. McGregor, Arizona Supreme Court;
• Eric A. Posner, The University of Chicago Law School;
• H. Jefferson Powell, Duke University School of Law;
• J. Mark Ramseyer, Harvard Law School;
• President Tom Ross, Davidson College and former director of the North Carolina
Administrative Office of the Courts;
• Barak D. Richman, Duke University School of Law;
• Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas;
• Judge Barbara J. Rothstein, United States District Court of the Western District of
Washington and director of the Federal Judicial Center;
• Chief Judge Anthony J. Scirica, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit;
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